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
Followin: is summary US views relations Latin American AIDA countries to USSA and satellizes referred to in Secretary's р.

CU message. IIS TA INR

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1. Ji mature nuclear test ben treaty while first step ahead in this field doer not end cold tar. Soviet leaders continue to



Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

ANA - Edwin M. Martin

evidence

Clearancemy No. Hughes (Con. 5, EUR-Mr. Davis (drawn)

Drafted by: MMartin: pat 0/80/03

s/s-12. herey (crart) d/3- herehome Marian. Thompson



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Military evidence uncompromising position on such matters as Berlin and Laos, and have thus far shown no convincing disposition to modify their views on whole series of clustuaneses matters other than limited step contained in prosone tready. They continue to make clear their ultimate goal of world communish and advocate what they term "national liberation movements of oppressed peoples" and assert they willing give material assistance such movements. Oubs maich has allied itself with communist camp plays active role in this regard in Latin America. Even if there should in future be some evidence of diminution of Soviet Bloc support for such attacks on free and democratic political and economic systems, there would remain in all countries of Latin America communist parties with varying degrees of indigenous strength desiring to establish totalitarian regimes and mence threats to present political, social and economic systems of countries of Hemisphere. For foreseeable future USSR JURESCLE ALLEGATED world communism and local communist parties must continue to be considered in Latin America as enemies both of existing order and of efforts through Alliance for Progress to accomplish major improvements in 14.

 Moscow-Resping conflict basically content for supremacy in leadership world communist movement although conflict is deeper than fast



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just tactics and involves national interests. There is no evidence that ultimate purpose of converting world to communism is not still shared by both parties. While intensity propaganda battle between Moscow and Peiping gives impression they differ sharply over tactics, and that Moscow more "peaceful", situation not this simple. We should bear mind relative strengths USSR and Communist China, and that it was USSR which put missiles in Cuba, threatening not only US but LA security. Further, it Soviet Union which has military potential cause crises such areas Berlin. If Soviet policy "peaceful coexistence" at least one viewed this light, it clear that aim of this policy is to lull peoples world into thinking USSR has no ulterior motives. Signing test ban treaty, while it done primarily for other reasons, gives Soviets opportunity proclaim success their "peace policy". US always willing seek solutions problems with USSR so long as no net loss to free world security involved. This has led some to draw conclusion that US and, is prepared make important concessions in order in some senses free world in general, support Soviets against Peiping. This is not true because we still believe ultimate objectives of both are XXXXXXXXXXXX inimical to free world and because we are no more prepared to sacrifice our real interest to Soviets in order to help them with Peiping than we expect they are ready to sacrifice what

they



they consider to be their own to us in order to reach agreements.

The Sino-Soviet dispute extends into all countries where there are communist or pro-communist parties as both sides attempt to exert their influence and have their policies prevail. It, therefore, obvious that local communist parties, regardless whether they choose "peaceful" Soviet line as opposed "militant" Chicom line, remain agents foreign power, and continue to be instruments in the cold war.

3. US relations with Soviet Union and bloc countries in political, economic and cultural fields have also confused some about position to be taken vis-a-vis local communists and vis-a-vis bloc countries. This latter problem falls basically under three headings of diplomatic relations, trade relations, and cultural relations including exchange of persons. In general, US actions have been directed toward penetrating the Soviet Bloc wich our influence. In this connection, should be remembered that as result large Presian and East European immigration US around turn century we have long association these areas. Thus US has latent pool good will these countries as result family ties which we attempting strengther to pursuit our policy influencing peoples and povernments these countries bottore more open societies, better informed about conditions in vestorn world and peaceful attitudes of free world.

The PL-480



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The PL-480 assistance we have rendered Poland and as its goods

(1) to help that country maintain the degree of independence it has
gained from Soviet control; (2) to foster and stimulate further independence; and (3) to assist the maintenance of a destern QUOUD presence.

and of US programs in Colone. If other stops in economic field taken take
place in future this will occur only where, after most careful considerate
to feel advantages to us in breaking through Iron Curtain, outwelch any
covantages bloc countries may receive with respect our already open
society.

In cultural, educational and technical exchange programs, situation is similar. US carefully plans and supervises exchanges to gain not advantage for us. We are in position to ensure this. In field of civil aviation US is in a position to take full advantage of reclipicity phases. Latin American countries are not.

4. It should be abundantly clear to all that these openings are designed not only to promote friendly relations with the peoples of these areas but also to encourage those peoples to strive toward passess wereoned fraction and to serve as a fewerable influence on the children of their poterments. We are also extempting to encourage matrional feelings and policies among the smaller fastern formulae countries subordinate to the USSR. These policies are undertined by nature of activations undertaken, by policy statements made by US officials,



US officials, by rigorous US government restriction of communists and Soviet Bloc activities in US, by US support of action against communists in third countries, including loss of US lives in combat against communists in Korea, Victness and Leos, and by auge expenditures of US toppayers money in maintaining some million military personnel overcess on borders communist world, \*\*EXELUTIONISTIC EXPRESSIVE ACTION ACTION ACTION OF THE PROPERTY OF

5. Most difficult problem in dealing with countries of Latin America will undoubtedly arise on practical questions of political, economic and cultural relations with bloc countries. It will not be easy to convince them that US can indivence Soviets but not vice versa while they cannot. Nevertheless this is what we must seek to do perhaps in low key, but with as much diplomatic skill as possible. It is suggested that in doing so suplacts be gut on practical effects in their countries of incressed relations wether than on theoretical considerations related to have of accounts doctaine for global Sowiet aims. We will try to app you with illustrations from various countries

It may be possible to touch lightly on fact that relative size and state



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and state of development of UC and USSE plus controls we can energise over our mutual relations make up less vulnerable than smaller and less developed LA states to Coviet economic pressures and penetusation and better able control precence Soviet officials in US on basis reciprocity.

In dealing with question of action against local communists it may be desirable to stress both their threat to local order, stability and freedom and fact they are component part of Saviet imperialism.

Latter point should continue to be made with as much practical evidence and support as can be produced to demonstrate their direct ties with and subservience to Moscow.

6. Should not be too difficult for Latin Americans to distinguish relations with Soviet Bloc from those with Cubs where even greater caution and controls are necessary. The Castro regime is an active and present threat in their midst, seeking to destroy their regimes. There is clear evidence of Castro internal tyranny and abolition of liberty, of his fixing negads, of his economic failures and of his aggressive purposes and acts in Latin America. Herisphere is on record with respect these points and incompatibility of communist Cuba with Inter-American system. US has set example of sharp distinction. In





fact US has restricted travel of US citizens to Guba and stopped US flag carrier flights, not because US security required it -- net effect would probably be a little on other side from strict UE standpoint -- but in order to make it easier for Latin Americans to take strong measures which in our view are required for their security.

- 7. Mowever, we recognize that in end we must probably be prepared to live as gracefully as possible with considerable increase in diplomatic, trade and cultural relations between Latin American countries and those of Soviet Bloc.
- 3. The problems of relations with Yugoslavia, which we do not consider as part of the bloc, will be dealt with in a separate instruction, related to Tite's forthcoming visit to LA.
  GP-2

EID.

RUSK

